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NOTES
(

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-A RIGHT OF
RECOVERY EXISTS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
INJURIES ARISING FROM THE FEAR OF CONTRACTING
AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE, EVEN WHEN SUCH INJURIES
ARE UNACCOMPANIED BY PHYSICAL IMP ACT AND
THE DISEASE IS NOT CONTRACTED. Faya v. Almaraz,
329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).

I.

INTRODUCTION

As incidents of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)I
reach epidemic proportions, an increasing number of individuals
infected with the disease must deal with the harsh physical and
psychological trauma associated with the reality that he or she will
likely die from the disease. Even the fear of coIitracting AIDS, with
or without a positive diagnosis of HIV infection, can result in
emotional distress that may significantly impact upon one's life. 2
Whether an individual may recover damages for this emotional
distress, regardless of whether the disease eventually manifests itself,
is a topic of continuing debate. Some might argue that one who is
diagnosed as HIV-negative should be thankful for that diagnosis,
and forego any attempt to recover damages for the emotional distress
1. AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), a retrovirus that
attacks the human immune system by invading host cells and replicating itself.
Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 439, 620 A.2d 327, 328 (1993). While the virus
may be latent for as long as ten years, it gradually weakens the immune system
and ultimately destroys the body's capacity to resist disease. Id. at 439, 620
A.2d at 328-29. An individual infected with AIDS suffers from a severely
compromised immune system, and is subjected to numerous diseases and other
infections that an otherwise healthy individual may be able to resist. Id. at
439, 620 A.2d at 329.
2. Individuals faced with the fear of contracting AIDS have suffered from
headaches, sleeplessness, nervous shock, fear, anxiety, grief, loss of appetite,
and post-traumatic stress disorder, among other ailments. Id. at.442, 620 A.2d
at 330; see a/so Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889,
891-92 (W. Va. 1991). Emotional reactions of this nature can so significantly
affect the victim's life that psychological counselling is required. Id. at 89192. Such psychological reactions may also render its victims unable to function
normally. Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 501,408 A.2d 728, 734 (1979).
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suffered before the negative test results were received. Several of the
nation's courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland, have
taken the contrary view. 3
In Faya v. AlmaraZ,4 the court of appeals held that Sonya Faya
(Faya) and Perry Mahoney Rossi (Rossi) (collectively, appellants)
could recover monetary damages for the fear of contracting AIDS,
notwithstanding their HIV-negative diagnoses, if the injuries occasioned by their fear could be objectively demonstrated. s Recovery
was limited, however, to injuries sustained from the time the appellants first learned that they may have come in contact with the AIDS
virus to the time they received their HIV-negative test results. 6
By allowing recovery for the mere fear of contracting an infectious disease, the Faya decision further defines the limits of compensable harm resulting from emotional distress. Increased litigation for
the recovery of damages for emotional distress injuries will surely be
one effect of the decision. Even if courts adhere to the objective
determination rule, the total amount of damages awarded in emotional distress actions may skyrocket because juries can now award
damages to plaintiffs who were previously ineligible to receive them.
The appellants were patients of Dr. Rudolf Almaraz (Dr. Almaraz or Almaraz), an oncological surgeon specializing in breast
cancer. 7 Unbeknownst to each patient, they were operated on by Dr.
Almaraz at a time when he knew that he was infected with the HIV
virus. 8 Almaraz had operated on Faya before he developed AIDS,
3. See infra notes 4, 87-90 and accompanying text.
4. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993). The companion case of Rossi v. Almaraz
is reported with Faya because it arises from a similar set of facts and
circumstances.
5. [d. at 439, 620 A.2d at 338-39. The court of appeals did not specifically state
how an injury may be objectively demonstrated. Presumably, the injury must
be reasonable under the circumstances, -and should be manifested by an external
condition or evidence indicative of a mental state. See, e.g., Vance, 286 Md.
490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979) (allowing plaintiff to recover for emotional distress
injuries where testimony indicated that she suffered from spontaneous crying,
was unable to function normally, and was too embarrassed to socialize, and
where such injuries were manifested in the deterioration of her physical
appearance); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909)
(holding that plaintiff may recover damages for fright and nervousness, where
such injuries rendered plaintiff unable to perform her household duties and
resulted in a medical diagnosis of nervous exhaustion).
6. Faya, 329 Md. at 455-56, 620 A.2d at 337. The court of appeals defined this
period as the reasonable window of anxiety. [d. at 456, 620 A.2d at 337. The
window of anxiety closes once satisfactory information becomes available to
put the fear of injury to rest. [d. at 456 n.lO, 620 A.2d at 337 n.l0. The court
implied that any emotional distress that continued after the appellants tested
HIV-negative might be unreasonable. [d. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337.
7. [d. at 440, 620 A.2d at 329.
8. [d.
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but had operated on Rossi shortly after being diagnosed with cytomegalovirus retinitis, an eye infection characteristic of full-blown
AIDS.9 Almaraz died of AIDS on November 16, 1990.10
The appellants learned of Almaraz's illness for the first time on
December 6, 1990, when they read about it in a local newspaper.1I
They immediately underwent blood tests which disclosed that neither
appellant was a carrier of the HIV virus. 12 Nonetheless, by December
11, 1990, the appellants had commenced separate suits against Almaraz's estate, his Maryland professional association business entity,
and Johns Hopkins Hospital for compensatory and punitive damages. 13 In their complaints, the appellants alleged that they suffered

9. Id. Almaraz first learned that he was a carrier of the HIV virus in 1986. Id.
Faya's operations occurred in October, 1988 and March, 1989. Id. Rossi's
operation took place on November 14, 1989. Id. Almaraz's first diagnosis of
cytomegalovirus retinitis was on October 27, 1989; this diagnosis was confirmed
by a second opthamologist on November 17, 1989. Id.
1O.Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 441, 620 A.2d at 329. The precise date that the appellants learned of
their HIV-negative status, when contrasted with the date they filed suit, is
unclear. Impliedly, they knew of their HIV-negative status sometime after
December 6, 1990 (when they first learned of Almaraz's illness), but on or
before December 11, 1990 (when they commenced suit against his estate for
compensatory and punitive damages). Id. Assuming both Faya and Rossi knew
of their HIV-negative status on the day the suit was filed, at a maximum,
their reasonable window of anxiety and the period for which they could recover
damages for their emotional distress was five days. Conceivably, the reasonable
window of anxiety could have been confined to mere hours, if the HIV-negative
test results were received later in the same day that the appellants learned of
Almaraz's illness.
13. Id. Both appellants alleged negligence, negligent failure to obtain their informed
consent, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 441, 620
A.2d at 330. Faya's complaint also alleged negligent misrepresentation and
breach of contract. Id. Rossi's amended complaint contained the additional
allegations of loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, and battery. Id.
Of these counts, the court of appeals did not address those relating to fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, loss of consortium, or breach
of fiduciary duty. In briefly addressing the count alleging battery, the court
concluded that the cause of action for lack of informed consent is one in tort
for negligence, and not one in tort for battery. Id. at 450 n.6, 620 A.2d at
334 n.6.
The court focused its analysis on what it deemed to be the core of
appellants' complaints-the allegations that Almaraz acted wrongfully in performing the appellants' operations without first informing them that he was
HI V-positive (and in Rossi's case, infected with AIDS), and that Almaraz and
Johns Hopkins Hospital failed to inform the appellants of any risk of contracting HIV incidental to Almaraz's performance of the operations. Id. at
441, 620 A.2d at 330. The appellants claimed that had they known of Dr.
Almaraz's illness, they could have withheld consent to their operations and
could thereby have avoided any exposure to the HIV virus. Id. at 441-42, 620
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from intense fear of contracting the AIDS virus as a proximate result
of the surgeries and their subsequent discovery of Dr. Almaraz's
illness. 14
II.

BACKGROUND
To recover damages for emotional distress, a plaintiff's injuries
must be predicated lipon the wrongful act of another. Thus, a claim
for emotional distress damages frequently accompanies a suit for
negligence.
Negligence is commonly defined as conduct that fails to meet
the established legal standard for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks of harm. IS To sustain an action in negligence, a
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant had a
legal duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the
protection of others; (2) that the defendant breached this duty; (3)
that there was a reasonable causal connection between the breach
and the injury to the plaintiff; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered
damage or actual loss resulting from the breach. 16
In the AIDS context, a physician entrusted with the preservation
of human life and the reduction of suffering may have an ethical
duty to inform his patients of his HIV-positive status. However, the
relevant inquiry is whether a similar duty is imposed upon the
physician by law. While there is little guidance from existing case
law concerning an HI V-positive physician's duty to inform his patient
of his HI V-positive status, an examination of the elements of negligence and their application in the context of infectious disease cases,
including AIDS, lends support for the imposition of such a duty.

A.

Duty
A duty isa legally recognized obligation to conform to a certain
standard of conduct toward another .17 Foreseeability is often an
important factor used to determine the existence of a duty.IS If it is

14.

15.
16.
17.

18.

A.2d at 330. Faya and Rossi's complaints alluded to the possibility that a
puncture or laceration in Almaraz's protective garments could have allowed
the commingling of his blood with their blood; however, they did not offer
proof of such puncture or laceration. [d.
[d. at 442, 620 A.2d at 330. The other injuries alleged by the appellants
included exposure to HIV and the risk of AIDS, physical injury and expenses
arising from HIV testing, pain, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional
distress, headaches, and sleeplessness. [d.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
[d. § 53, at 356.
B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 141, 538 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1988).
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foreseeable that harm will befall another because of an actor's
conduct, the actor may have a duty to refrain from engaging in that
conduct. 19
The recognition of a duty to prevent the transmission of infectious diseases is well-established. 20 This duty extends to cases involving
the negligent transmission of venereal diseases. 21 A recent Maryland
case is illustrative.
In B.N. v. K. K., 22 the plaintiff and the defendant were involved
in a sexual relationship during a period when the defendant knew he
was infected with genital herpes, but failed to so inform the plaintiff. 23
Such failure included an occasion when the defendant was aware
that his genital herpes was active and would be transmitted, but the
defendant nonetheless engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff.24 Subsequent to this particular encounter, the plaintiff discovered
she was infected with the disease. 2s
In addressing the plaintiff's negligence cause of action, the B.N.
court began with an inquiry into whether the defendant had a duty
to inform the plaintiff of his infection.26 The court observed that the
concept of duty is predicated upon the "responsibility each of us
bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to
others. "27 Because the defendant knew that he had active genital
19. [d. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178.
20. See Gilbert v. Hoffman, 23 N.W. 632 (Iowa 1885) (sustaining plaintiff's
negligence action against hotel operator whose misrepresentation that premises
were free from smallpox infection induced plaintiff to stay in hotel, given
evidence that plaintiff later contracted smallpox during her stay); Earle v.
Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (recognizing cause of
action on behalf of plaintiff who contracted tuberculosis from her parents'
landlord, where the landlord, although infected with tuberculosis, negligently
failed to warn tenants of her infection and failed to abstain from close personal
contact with those tenants); Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884)
(permitting recovery based on negligence of father who took his children into
plaintiff's boarding house while infected with whooping cough, thereby infecting
plaintiff's child and the children of her boarders).
21. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989) (recognizing a
negligence cause of action for transmission of genital herpes); Duke v. Housen,
589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979) (recognizing the existence
of a claim for negligent transmission of gonorrhea, but reversing plaintiff's
damage award because the claim was filed after expiration of statute of
limitations).
22. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
23. [d. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177.
24. [d.
25. [d. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177. The plaintiff knew that the defendant was

the source of her infection because she had been monogamous throughout the
course of their relationship. [d.
26. [d. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178.
27. Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975), quoted in B.N.,_
312 Md. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178.
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herpes, yet engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, the court
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be
harmed by the defendant's conduct. 28 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that the defendant had a duty to either refrain
from having sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, or advise her of
his infection prior thereto. 29
While the existence of a cause of action for the negligent
transmission of AIDS is an issue of first impression in most jurisdictions, of the few courts that have been confronted with the issue,
most have been willing to impose a duty similar to that imposed in
B.N. v. K.K.30 For example, in Doe v. Johnson ,3) a case involving
Los Angeles Lakers basketball superstar Earvin "Magic" Johnson,
Jr., the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan held that a defendant owes a duty to his sexual partner to
disclose the fact that he may have the HIV virus if, at the time of
their sexual relationship, he (1) had actual knowledge that he was
infected with the HIV virus, (2) had experienced symptoms associated
with the HIV virus, or (3) had actual knowledge that a prior sexual
partner had been diagnosed with the HIV virus. 32 The court observed
that where any of these factual scenarios are present, the "burden
on [the infected] individual in revealing his or her HIV virus information is minimal when compared to the high risks of the disease. "33
The Supreme Court of New York expressed a similar philosophy
in Petri v. Bank of New York CO.34 The plaintiff who did not have
AIDS and was not infected with the HIV virus, brought a claim
28. B.N., 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179.
29. [d.

30. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
31. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993). The plaintiff, Jane Doe, alleged that
Johnson had a legal duty to prevent the transmission of the HIV virus to her,
and that he negligently breached that legal duty because he knew or should
have known that he was infected with the virus. [d. at 1386. Allegedly, Johnson
transmitted the HIV virus to Doe during one or both of their sexual encounters.
[d. at 1385. Doe further alleged that because Johnson was sexually active with
multiple partners prior to his sexual encounters with her, he knew or should
have known that he had a high risk of becoming infected with the HIV virus.
[d. Specifically, Doe argued that Johnson should have (1) warned her about
his sexually promiscuous past, (2) informed her at the time of their sexual
contact that he either "may have HIV" or did have HIV, (3) not engaged in
sexual contact with her, or (4) used a condom or similar method of protection
that would act as a barrier to transmission of the HIV virus to Doe. [d.
32. [d. at 1393. Thus, if Doe could prove that Johnson had actual knowledge of
his HIV infection at the time of their sexual encounters, had experienced
symptoms of such an infection prior thereto, or had actual knowledge that a
prior sexual partner had been diagnosed with the HIV virus prior thereto, she
would have a valid cause of action against Johnson for negligent transmission
of the HIV virus. [d.
33. [d.
34. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
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against Vaughn, a fellow bank employee, for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 3s Although the claim was not sufficiently
explained in the plaintiff's pleadings, it was apparently founded upon
allegations that the plaintiff had a sexual relationship with Vaughn,
and that Vaughn failed to inform the plaintiff until the conclusion
of their relationship that he was HIV-positive. 36
The court held that the plaintiff's claim against Vaughn was too
speculative and remote. 37 When discussing whether an infected individual has a duty to inform his sexual partner of his HIV -positive
status, however, the court opined that the infected individual has a
duty "to use reasonable care not to transmit a sentence of death to
his or her partner. "38 The court implied that this duty arises from
the "special" relationship between the parties. 39 The court further
opined that "if the state is to maintain the role of protector against
needless death,' '40 a duty to warn a sexual partner of HIV infection
must be established. 41 The court also cited the existence of a great
and overriding public interest in limiting the spread of AIDS as
support for the imposition of this duty.42
35. ld. at 609-10. Vaughn was one of several named defendants in this action.
Plaintiff's.primary claim was against the Bank of New York Mortgage Company
(the Bank) for wrongful discharge due to discrimination and the Bank's fear
that he had AIDS or was at a high risk for contracting AIDS. ld. at 610. The
claim against the Bank was founded upon § 296(l)(a) of the Human Rights
Law, which prohibits employers and others from engaging in discriminatory
conduct against those with disabilities. ld. at 610-11. AIDS and HIV infection
are disabilities falling within the protection that this section of the Human
Rights Law affords. ·ld. The protection extends to those with actual disabilities,
as well as to those whose disabilities are merely perceived. ld. at 611. Accordingly, the plaintiff's cause of action against the Bank for wrongful discharge
could be maintained if he could prove that the perception that he had AIDS
was the motivating force for his termination. ld. at 612.
36. ld. at 612-13.
37. ld. at 614. The court reasoned that "[s]omeone who has been exposed to HIV
infection but has not come down with it has not suffered a physical injury for
which a recovery in damages may be allowed." ld. at 613. While the court
thus dismissed the plaintiff's claim against Vaughn, the dismissal was without
prejudice, thereby allowing the plaintiff to "reinstate [his claim] in the event
[he] becomes infected with HIV." ld. at 614.
38. ld. at 613.
39. ld. The court opined that the "uniquely intimate and special form of contact"
, present in a sexual relationship necessitates the imposition of a duty to warn
one's sexual partner of HIV infection. ld. But cf. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F.
Supp. 1382, 1393 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (imposing a duty to disclose HIV infection
to a sexual partner, but placing little emphasis on the sexual relationship
between the parties because "no special duties" arise from a consensual sexual
encounter between two adults).
40. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
41. ld. at 613.
42. ld. Arguably, these principles apply with equal force to non-sexual relationships.
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Breach

Once a duty is legally recognized, there must be some standard
by which the court is able to determine whether the actor has breached
that duty. A breach of a legal duty is commonly defined as the
failure of an individual to conform to the required standard of
conduct. 43
Traditionally, the required standard of conduct in negligence
actions is that of the reasonable person under like circumstances. 44
It has been stated that an actor "should realize that his act involves
an unreasonable risk of [harm], if a reasonable man knowing so
much of the circumstances surrounding the actor at the time of his
act as the actor knows or should know, would realize the existence
of the risk and its unreasonable character.' '4S
The reasonable person standard has been previously applied by
the courts in the context of infectious diseases. 46 The Court of Appeals
of Maryland, in B.N. v. K.K.,47 recognized that "[w]hen a reasonable
person knows or should have known that certain types of conduct
constitute an unreasonable risk of harm to another, he or she has
the duty to refrain from that conduct."48 Thus, assuming as true the
plaintiff's allegations that the defendant knew he was infected with
genital herpes at the time of their sexual encounter, the defendant
"had a duty either to refrain from sexual contact with [plaintiff] or
to warn her of his condition. "49 If the defendant "negligently failed
to do either, he breached his duty. "50
Likewise, in Long v. Adams,s I the Georgia Court of Appeals
concluded that the defendant breached the duty of ordinary care not
to injure others when, knowing that she was infected with genital

43. KEETON, supra note 6, at 164.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). Where the individual upon
whom the duty is imposed has special knowledge, such as a physician, that
individual may be held to a heightened standard of care. [d. § 290 cmt. f.
45. [d. § 284 cmt. a.
46. See Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989); R.A.P. v. B.J.P.,
428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("A reasonable person should
know that if he/she has a contagious, sexually transmittable disease ... the
disease is likely to be communicated through sexual contact."); Kliegel v.
Aitken, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (Wis. 1896) ("[DIne who negligently-that is, through
want of ordinary care-exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease,
which such other thereby contracts, is liable in damages therefor, in the absence
of contributory negligence .... ").
47. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
48. McCance v. Lindau, 63 Md. App. 504, 514, 492 A.2d 1352, 1358 (1985),
quoted in B.N., 312 Md. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178.
49. B.N., 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179.
50. [d.
51. 333 S.E:2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
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herpes, she engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff without
informing him of her infection. 52 Similarly, in Doe v. Johnson ,53
although the court did not address the truth of the plaintiff's factual
allegations that Johnson knew or should have known that he had or
may have had HIV at the time of his sexual encounters with her,
impliedly, if these allegations were proven, Johnson would have
breached a legal duty to the plaintiff to inform her that he either
had or may have had the HIV virus. 54 The court noted that the risk
to the plaintiff of contracting the disease outweighed the burden on
Johnson to reveal his HIV virus information. 55

c. Causal Connection
If a plaintiff is able to establish the existence of a legal duty
and the· subsequent breach of that duty by a defendant, the plaintiff
must then establish a causal connection between the defendant's
action and the damage or injuries that the plaintiff has suffered.
This causal connection is frequently referred to as "proximate cause,"
a court-established limitation on a defendant's responsibility for the
consequences of his conduct. 56 While this limitation is often examined
in light of the nature and degree of the factual connection between
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's damages, policy considerations also play an important role. 57
Where the transmission of infectious diseases is at issue, causation may be easily established if the defendant is the only individual
who could have infected the plaintiff. 58 Such was the case in B.N.
v. K.K.59 The plaintiff had not engaged in sexual contact with anyone
other than the defendant during the relevant period; hence, the genital
herpes she contracted could only have been a result of the defendant's
conduct. 60
Similarly, in Berner v. Caldwell, 61 where the plaintiff presented
credible evidence that she contracted a disease that could only be
52. [d. at 854.
53. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
54. [d. at 1393. But see C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that defendant, who learned he had AIDS after his relationship with
plaintiff, was under no duty to warn plaintiff when, at the time of their
relationship, it was not reasonably foreseeable that he had the disease or that
plaintiff would suffer harm through intimate sexual contact with defendant).
55. Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1393.
56. KEETON, supra note 16, § 41, at 263-64.
57. [d.
58. See B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1I75 (1988). In cases involving
sexually transmitted diseases, causation may be more difficult to prove if any
number of sexual partners could have transmitted the disease to plaintiff.
59. [d.
60. [d. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1I77.

61. 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989).
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transmitted through sexual contact, that the defendant was the only
individual with whom she had sexual contact, that she did not have
the disease prior to her relationship with the defendant, and that
before the end of their relationship she discovered she was infected
with the disease, the inference that the defendant had infected the
plaintiff was sufficient to support a claim of negligence. 62
The transmission of the HIV virus through sexual contact is
sufficiently analogous to these cases to support the proposition that
causation may be easily established if the defendant is the only HIVinfected individual with whom the plaintiff had contact of the type
and nature sufficient to transmit the disease. Presumably, once a
legal duty is established and it is shown that the defendant breached
that duty, a causal connection between the defendant's breach and
the plaintiff's injuries will follow.
D.

Damages

Once causation is established, it is likely that any physical pain
and suffering or related damages will be sufficient to satisfy the last
element of negligence. 63 Where an infectious disease is actually contracted, the element of damages is generally satisfied. Damage in
B.N. v. K.K.64 occurred when the plaintiff contracted genital herpes,
"a serious, painful, and incurable disease. "65
Damages similar in nature may occur through the negligent
transmission of the HIV virus. The damages alleged by the plaintiff
in Doe v. lohnsorf>6 included physical illness, severe emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, medical expenses, and lost wages
and benefits.67 Although at the time of her action Doe had not yet
developed AIDS, she was certain to acquire it and "suffer a slow,
certain, and painful death. "68
62. [d. at 688.
63. It may be difficult to establish actual loss if the only injuries alleged result
from emotional distress. See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
64. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
65. [d. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. Genital herpes is a sexually transmitted viral
disease that may be chronic and recurring, and for which no known cure exists.
[d. at 140 n.5, 538 A.2d at 1178 n.5. Its characteristics include itching, burning
genitalia, pain on urination, headaches, swollen lymph nodes, general muscular
aches, fever, and overall discomfort. [d. at 140 n.4, 538 A.2d at 1178 n.4. It
is the third most common sexually transmitted disease and can result in
occasional complications such as meningitis and radiculitis. [d. at 140 n. 7, 538
A.2d at 1178 n.7. Genital herpes has also been associated with the development
of cervical cancer, with the dangers of miscarriage and premature delivery
during childbirth, and with a high mortality rate for the children of its carriers.
[d. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1180.
66. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
67. [d. at 1385.
68. [d.
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THE INSTANT CASE

In Faya, the appellants alleged that Dr. Almaraz was negligent
in failing to inform them of his HIV-positive status. 69 The damages
alleged by the appellants consisted primarily of emotional distress
and related injuries. 10
To prevail in their negligence action, Almaraz must have breached
a duty of care owed to the appellants, and that breach must have
been the proximate cause of their injuries. lI The court thus began
its analysis by deciding whether Dr. Almaraz owed a duty to the
appellants to either inform them of his condition or to refrain from
operating upon them.72
The Court of Appeals of Maryland previously examined the
scope of duty owed by one infected with a sexually transmitted
disease in B.N. v. K.K.,13 where it held that the defendant had a
legal duty to the plaintiff to either refrain from sexual contact with
her, or to inform her of his infected condition prior to such contact. 14
The similarities between genital herpes and AIDS,1s in addition to
the basic concept underlying the imposition of a duty, 16 allowed the
Faya court to arrive at a similar conclusion. Because AiDS may be
transmitted from surgeon to patient during an operation if the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

329 Md. 435, 447, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1988).
[d. at 441, 620 A.2d at 330.
[d.
[d.
312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
[d. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179. The duty arose because of the highly infectious
nature of genital herpes and the foreseeability of its transmission. [d.
75. [d. Genital herpes is a sexually transmitted disease that is highly contagious,
painful and incurable. [d. AIDS is likewise contagious, often painful and
invariably fatal. See Faya, 329 Md. at 439-42, 620 A.2d at 329-30. The HIV
virus is typically transmitted through genital fluids or blood that is transmitted
from one person to another through sexual contact, the sharing of needles in
intravenous drug usage, blood transfusions, infiltration into wounds, or from
mother to child during pregnancy or birth. [d. at 439, 620 A.2d at 329. Four
separate studies conducted during the years 1985-89 failed to disclose any
documented cases of transmission of the HIV virus from HIV infected surgeons
to patients. [d. at 446 n.3, 620 A.2d at 332 n.3. Another study found that the
risk of HIV transmission from infected patient to health care worker was 0.30/0
per exposure. [d. Although the risk of HIV transmission appears to be extremely
low, especially where the surgeon employs proper barrier techniques, the court
of appeals recognized that the probability of harm occurring is not the sole
factor for consideration when determining the existence of a duty. [d. at 44749, 620 A.2d at 333. The seriousness of the potential harm must also be
considered. [d. at 448, 620 A.2d at 333.
76. That basic concept is that each of us has a responsibility to exercise due care
to avoid the unreasonable risk of harm to others. [d.
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surgeon's blood is somehow commingled with that of the patient,77
the court concluded that Almaraz may have owed a duty to the
appellants to either disclose his condition or refrain from operating
upon them.78 The court cited Sard v. Hardy79 for the proposition
that a surgeon has a legal duty, absent emergencies, to obtain the
"informed consent" of a patient before surgery is performed. 80 An
77. The commingling of a surgeon's blood with that of his patient is not difficult
to envision. Professionals who perform seriously invasive procedures, such as
a surgeon or a dentist, may puncture their skin with any number of sharp
instruments, needles, or bone or tooth fragments. Larry Gostin, Hospitals,
Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: the "Right to Know" the Health
Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 20 (1989). Studies
have indicated that a surgeon's glove will be cut or punctured in approximately
one out of four cases. Id. at 20. A surgeon will sustain a significant cut to
the skin in one out of 40 cases. Id. These studies demonstrate the very real
possibility that a doctor may transmit the HIV virus to his patient.
78. Faya, 329 Md. at 448, 620 A.2d at 333. The Faya court found overwhelming
support for its position in a policy statement on HI V-infected physicians issued
by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association (the "AMA"),
'which recommends that an infected physician either refrain from performing
procedures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission to a patient, or
perform those procedures only with the patient's consent. Id. at 448-49, 620
A.2d at 334. The report further recommended that an infected physician disclose
his condition to a public health officer or a local review committee, which
would then determine the activities the physician could perform. Id. at 449,
620 A.2d at 334. The consent of both the local review committee and the
patient would be required before the physician could perform surgery. Id.
Because Almaraz failed to inform the appellants of his HI V-positive status,
thereby denying them the .opportunity to withhold their consent, he may have
breached a legal duty that may have been owed to the appellants. Id. at 45960, 620 A.2d at 339. Whether an actual legal duty existed was a question that
the court believed should \Ie addressed by a jury, after an evaluation of
Almaraz's conduct and its consequences. Id. at 460, 620 A.2d at 339.
79. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 101" (1977).
80. Faya, 329 Md. at 452 n.6, 620 A.2d at 339 n.6. A comprehensive analysis of
the doctrine of informed consent is set forth in Behringer v. Princeton Medical
Ctr.; 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). Behringer, an otolaryngologist and plastic surgeon, had his surgical privileges suspended shortly
after being diagnosed with AIDS. Id. at 1254. In examining whether the
doctrine of informed consent required Behringer to disclose his illness to his
patients, the court weighed Behringer's right to perform invasive procedures
against the patient's rights, and held that the patient's rights prevailed. Id. at
1283. The court argued that an HIV-infected physician should withdraw from
performing any invasive procedure that would pose a risk to a patient. Id.
Utilizing reasoning not unlike that of the Faya court, the Behringer court
asserted that "[w]here the ultimate harm is death, even the presence of a low
risk of transmission justifies the adoption of a policy which precludes invasive
procedures where there is 'any' risk of transmission .... The ultimate risk to
the patient is so absolute-so devastating-that it is untenable to argue against
informed consent combined with a restriction on procedures which present 'any
risk' to the patient." Id. The court opined that "[a]s small as the risk to any
individual patient may be," when one considers that an infected surgeon may
perform many operations "the aggregate risk thus becomes significant." Id.
at 1283 n.20.

1993]

Faya v. Almaraz

281

informed consent can only be obtained when the patient is provided
with all of the information material to the patient's decision. 81
In recognizing such a duty, the Faya court placed little emphasis
on the trial court's assertion that the transmission of AIDS from
doctor to patient is a mere theoretical possibility when the surgeon
utilizes proper barrier techniques. 82 The court reasoned that even
though the appellants did not allege an actual exposure to the HIV
virus, it would be unfair to penalize them for lacking the information
to establish an actual avenue of transmission of the virus into their
bloodstreams. 83
The relevant inquiries then became whether the appellants' injuries were proximately caused by Dr. Almaraz's failure to inform
them of his HIV-positive status and whether those injuries were
legally compensable. The court accepted without elaboration that
Almaraz's breach of his legal duty was ·the proximate cause of the
appellants' injuries. 84 The court spent considerably more time examining whether the appellants' fear and mental and emotional
distress injuries were legally compensable.

81. [d. The knowledge that one's surgeon is HIV-positive would likely be material

in deciding whether to allow that surgeon to perform one's surgery. The
importance and effect of this knowledge was considered by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991), where the issue on appeal was whether the hospitals where
an HIV -infected doctor was employed should be permitted to disclose the
doctor's HIV -positive status. The hospitals believed that it was their duty to
inform the doctor's patients of their potential exposure to the HIV virus and
to offer them treatment, testing and counseling. [d. at 1293. In weighing the
competing interests of the doctor and his patients, including the doctor's
concerns that he would suffer both personally and professionally if his illness
was disclosed, the court tipped the scales "in favor of the public health,
regardless of the small potential for transmittal of the fatal virus." [d. at 1297.
82. Faya, 329 Md. at 443, 620 A.2d at 330. Appellants did not allege that Almaraz
failed to use these techniques, or that as a result of that failure an incident
occurred that may have allowed the HIV virus to enter their bloodstreams. [d.
at 443, 620 A.2d at 330-31. Accordingly, the trial court held that the appellants
failed to establish any exposure to the HIV virus. [d. at 443, 620 A.2d at 330.
Even if exposure had occurred, the appellants' negative test results more than
six months after surgery made it extremely unlikely that they would develop
AIDS. [d. at 443, 620 A.2d at 331. Hence, the trial court reasoned that absent
any exposure to the HIV virus, the appellants' injuries resulted from the fear
that "something that did not happen could have happened," and thus were
not compensable. [d. The trial court dismissed the appellants' complaints for
failure to state a legally compensable injury. [d.
83. [d. at 457, 620 A.2d at 337.
84. [d. at 450, 459, 620 A.2d at 334, 339. The court merely stated that appellants
alleged facts which, if proven, "indicate that Dr. Almaraz may have breached
a legal duty, thereby causing them to suffer legally compensable injuries." [d.
at 459, 620 A.2d at 339.
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Specifically, the appellants alleged that they incurred injuries
consisting of HIV exposure and the risk of AIDS, physical injury
and expenses resulting from blood testing for the HIV virus, pain,
fear, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional distress, headaches, and sleeplessness. 85 To determine whether these were legally
compensable injuries, the court looked to both existing Maryland
case law and the law from other jurisdictions for guidance.
The court first examined the divergent opinions of other jurisdictions on the question of whether damages are available to individuals who test HIV -negative but suffer from the fear of contracting
AIDS and the physical consequences thereof. Those courts that have
refused to atlow the recovery of damages under these circumstances
have often done so because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an
actual exposure to the HIV virus, and/or failed to suffer from any
compensable injuries. 86
A less rigid approach has been adopted by those courts that
have allowed the recovery of damages for emotional distress notwithstanding HIV -negative test results. The primary focus of these
courts has been the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS. Oftentimes, as in Johnson v. West Virginia University
Hospital,87 the nature of the plaintiff's injuries is an element considered by the court in its evaluation of the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's fear.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
allowed a police officer who tested HIV -negative after being bitten
by an AIDS-infected patient to recover damages for emotional distress. 88 The court observed that the wounds inflicted by the bite
85. [d. at 442, 620 A.2d at 330.
86. See Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that

plaintiff could not recover for fear of contracting AIDS where he failed to
allege that the syringe with which he was stuck contained contaminated blood,
and where he tested HIV-negative at least five times during the 13 month
period after the incident); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp.
1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to allow recovery to a wife whose husband had
been negligently inflicted with the HIV virus where the wife, although exposed
to the disease, failed to allege physical injury or illness); Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. Doe, 840 P .2d 288 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that there was no right of
recovery for plaintiffs who could prove exposure to HIV but who could not
offer competent evidence of physical injury resulting therefrom); Hare v. State,
570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 1991) (denying recovery to a hospital employee
bitten by an unrestrained inmate, where the employee failed to prove that the
inmate was infected, and where the employee tested HIV-negative); Funeral
Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield 'Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W.
Va. 1991) (refusing to allow recovery for a mortician who had worn protective
clothing while embalming an AIDS-infected corpse and who failed to allege
any method of exposure to the HIV virus).
87. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
88. [d. at 894.
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presented an actual exposure to the HIV virus, and were thus a
factor supporting the reasonableness of the officer's fear of contracting AIDS.89 The court emphasized, however, that mere contact with
an ,HIV-infected individual is not enough to warrant an award of
damages; rather, both a physical exposure to the HIV virus and
physical manifestations of emotional distress are required. 90
A more comprehensive discussion of what constitutes "reasonable" fear was articulated by the court in Carroll v. Sisters of St.
Francis Health Services, Inc. 91 In Carroll, a hospital visitor who was
pricked by contaminated needles sued the hospital for damages
allegedly occasioned by her fear of contracting AIDS.92 The plaintiff
was unable to demonstrate both an actual exposure to the HIV virus
and that she tested HIV-positive. 93
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in reversing summary judgment
entered against the plaintiff on her claim for emotional distress
damages, relied heavily on Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating,94 which
it construed as "set[ting] a standard of 'reasonableness' of the
plaintiff's fear. "9S That standard implies that emotional distress
injuries may be unreasonable if they arise after the fear of contracting
an illness or disease becomes unrealistic. 96
The Faya court aligned itself with the approaches utilized by
Johnson and Carroll when it determined that the appellants' fear of
contracting AIDS was not unreasonable as a matter of law. The
89. Id. In addition to the wounds inflicted by the bite, the officer also suffered
injuries consisting of sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and other physical evidence
of emotional distress. Id. at 892.
90. Id. at 894.
91. 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
92. Id. at 586. Plaintiff was pricked by the contaminated needles when she sought
to retrieve paper towels from what she believed to be a paper towel dispenser.
Id. The object into which plaintiff placed her right hand was actually a
contaminated needle receptacle. Id. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the hospital
was negligent in fjiiling to place a warning label on the receptacle, and in
placing the receptacle adjacent to the wash basin when it so closely resembled
a paper towel dispenser. Id. As a result of the alleged negligence, the plaintiff
sustained injuries that included anxiety, fear, and other emotional distress. Id.
at 587.
93. Id. at 586-87.
94. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982). The plaintiffs in Laxton were permitted to
recover damages for mental anguish arising from the ingestion of polluted
water, notwithstanding the lack of physical symptoms indicative of an illness.
Id. at 434. Recovery was limited, however, to the "time between discovery of
the ingestion and the negative medical diagnosis or other information that puts
to rest the fear of injury." Id.
95. Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 587.
96. A fear of contracting an illness or disease may be deemed unrealistic if, for
example, a negative medical diagnosis is made or, in the case of infectious
diseases, the incubation period has expired.
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court refused to require the appellants to prove an actual avenue of
transmission of the HIV virus. 'T7 Nonetheless, following the lead of
Laxton, the court declared that the appellants' continued fear of
contracting AIDS after the receipt of their HIV-negative test results
might be unreasonable. 98 The court thus limited the appellants' possible recovery to their reasonable window of anxiety, defined as "the
period between which they learned of Almaraz's illness and when
they received their HIV-negative results. "99
The court next examined whether the nature of the appellants'
injuries should preclude their right to recover damages for emotional
distress. The court acknowledged the rigidity of the former Maryland
rule that a. plaintiff could not recover for fright or mental suffering
.arising from the negligent acts of another unless such injuries were
connected with physical impact or injury.J()O This "physical impact"
rule would likely have precluded the appellants' recovery because the
only physical impact or injuries alleged were their blood tests for
HIV antibodies. 101 Because of the gradual loosening of the physical
impact rule in Maryland, however, which began with Green v. T.A.
Shoemaker & Co., 102 the court concluded that the injuries suffered
by appellants were legally compensable. 103
The court's conclusion is well-grounded in precedent. As the
court itself observed, similar injuries have been found compensable
by the court of appeals in cases involving issues other than the fear
of contracting AIDS. In Green, for example, the plaintiff suffered
from fright and nervous shock resulting from her exposure to repeated rock blastings in the vicinity of her home. I04 Noting its
inclination to allow recovery for emotional distress when "a material
97. 329 Md. 435, 455, 620 A.2d 327, 336-37 (1993).
98. [d. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39.
99. [d. at 459, 620 A.2d at 339.
100. [d. at 456, 620 A.2d at 337. Traditionally, Maryland courts refused to allow

101.
102.
103.
104.

a cause of action for mere fright or mental suffering because these injuries
can be easily simulated. Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 11 Md. 69, 77, 73
A. 688, 691 (1909). It is also difficult to measure the suffering occasioned by
such injuries and to ascertain the truth thereof. [d. at 77, 73 A. at 691.
Faya, 329 Md. at 441, 620 A.2d at 330. Impliedly, the physical impact or
injury resulted from the pin prick that was made to appellants' skin as a result
of the blood testing.
11 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
Faya, 329 Md. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39.
Green, 11 Md. at 71, 73 A. at 689. Although large rocks and stones were
propelled onto the plaintiff's property, causing damage to her dwelling and
the contents thereof, the plaintiff was never actually hit by a rock or a stone.
[d. at 71-72, 73 A. at 689. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was put in such continual
fear for her life that the resultant nervousness rendered her unable to perform
her household duties. [d. at 74, 73 A. at 690. She eventually became incapacitated by her fright and nervousness. [d.
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physical injury. . result[s] from fright caused by a wrongful act, "lOS
the court of appeals held that the plaintiff's injuries were legally
compensable notwithstanding the absence of physical impact between
the plaintiff and a falling rock or stone.H16 The court reasoned that
because the blasting was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the injuries ought to have been foreseeable as a consequence
thereof, there was no just reason to adhere to the general rule
prohibiting recovery for nervous "affections" unaccompanied by
physical impact. 107
The rationale of the Green court was also the basis of the court's
decision in Mahnke v. Moore,los where the plaintiff instituted an
action in tort against her father for injuries which included shock,
mental anguish and permanent nervous and physical injuries. 109 The
court recognized the plaintiff's right to sustain an action against her
father's estate for the emotional injuries which she suffered, notwithstanding that those injuries were unaccompanied by physical
impact. llo Similarly, in Vance v. Vance,1l1 plaintiff's shock, sleep1993]

105. Id. at 77, 173 A. at 691. Recovery would not be allowed for mere fright
without any physical injury resulting therefrom. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 81, 173 A. at 692.
108. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
109. Id. at 62, 77 A.2d at 924. The plaintiff's injuries resulted from several traumatic
events. She witnessed the murder of her mother by her father, and was kept
with her mother's dead body for six days. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff's
father committed suicide before her eyes, splattering the plaintiff's face and
clothing with his blood. Id.
110. Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 927. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Wicomico County, which held that the plaintiff could not
sustain a cause of action in tort against the executrix of her father's estate for
personal injuries caused by his atrocious acts. Id. at 65, 77 A.2d at 924-25. In
reversing the judgment, the court relied on the rule adopted in Green, that
where the wrongful act complained of is the proximate cause of the injury and
the injury should have been foreseeable, the question of damages for that
injury should be left to the jury. Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 926-27. The court
further recognized that "a plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for
nervous shock or injury caused, without physical impact, by fright arising
directly from defendant's negligent act or omission, and resulting in some
clearly apparent and substantial physical injury as manifested by an external
condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state." Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 927 (quoting Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397,404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933». The case was remanded
to the trial court for a determination as to whether the injuries suffered by
plaintiff were "substantial" and thereby compensable. Id.
The court made its ruling despite the fact that a child is generally not
permitted to maintain an action in tort against its parent. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d
at 926. The court circumvented this general rule by reasoning that where the
parent tortfeasor is deceased, an attempt to maintain discipline and tranquility
in the home by prohibiting an action in tort by a child against a parent is
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lessness, and other nervous disorders were deemed physical injuries
that justified recovery of damages for emotional distress. 1l2 Refusing
to confine the term "physical" to only bodily injuries, the court
found the plaintiff's injuries compensable because the injuries were
capable of objective determination. 1I3
More recently, in B.N. v. K.K.,1I4 the court of appeals held that
a nurse who contracted genital herpes from a doctor who failed to
inform her of his infection prior to their sexual relations could be
compensated for emotional distress if she could objectively demonstrate the severity of her injuries. m

Ill.

112.

113.

114.

115.

illogical. Id. The court further reasoned that the parent-child relationship was
not in need of protection, where as in Mahnke, the parent forfeited his parental
authority and privileges by the commission of such cruel and inhumane acts.
Id.
286 Md. 490, .408 A.2d 728 (1979). After nearly 20 years of marriage and after
bearing two children, the plaintiff learned that her husband was not divorced
from his first wife at the time of his purported marriage to the plaintiff. Id.
at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729-30. As a result, the plaintiff was unable to function
normally, could not sleep, and was too embarrassed to socialize with even
those individuals who were attempting to be kind to her. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d
at 730. The plaintiff sued her husband for compensatory damages for emotional
distress that she allegedly suffered as a result of his negligent misrepresentation
concerning the status of their marriage. Id. at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729. She
also sought damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, which
she alleged resulted from his negligent misrepresentation and her subsequent
knowledge of their true marital status. Id.
Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 134. The plaintiff's claim for damages was based upon
her husband's negligent misrepresentation. Id. The plaintiff's evidence was
insufficient, however, to establish the separate tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 504, 408 A.2d at 735. To impose liability for this
tort, a defendant's conduct must be intentional or reckless, the conduct must
be extreme and outrageous, there must be a causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and the emotional distress must
be severe. Id. The court refused to hold that the defendant's conduct in Vance
was intentional, reckless, extreme or outrageous. Id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 737.
Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The court opined that "physical" merely means
that the injury for which recovery is sought is capable of objective determination. Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34. In this case, the plaintiff's injuries
were manifested in her external condition. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The
deterioration of the plaintiff's physical appearance was evidenced by her
unkempt hair, sunken cheeks and dark eyes. Id.
312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). This case was before the court of appeals
on a question certified by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. Id. at 135, 538 A.2d at 1176. The certified question, which the
court answered in the affirmative, was: "Does Maryland Recognize A Cause
Of Action For Either Fraud, Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, Or
Negligence Resulting From The Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous, Contagious, And Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes?" Id.
Id. at 147-49, 538 A.2d at 1181-82. As a prerequisite to this finding, the court
first determined that the plaintiff could maintain a cause of action in negligence
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Thus, in allowing the appellants to recover for their injuries, the
Faya court did not depart significantly from the court of appeals'
prior rulings allowing recovery for emotional distress. Its decision in
Faya was a logical extension of Green and Mahnke, which require
that emotional distress injuries be a proximate result of the wrongful
act of another, and Vance and B.N., which require that those injuries
be capable of objective determination. Accordingly, having alleged
facts that, if proven, would establish that Almaraz owed the appellants a legal duty, that such duty was breached, and that their injuries
were the proximate cause of that breach, the appellants could recover
damages for emotional distress if the injuries resulting therefrom
were capable of objective determination. 1I6
Of course, an award of damages would not be made unless Dr.
Almaraz was negligent. In this regard, Faya will have little impact
upon existing Maryland law. Instead, its impact can be found in the
court's willingness to allow recovery of damages for the fear that
something which could have happened did not occur.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

To its proponents, the Faya decision represents a logical extension of existing Maryland case law and does nothing more than
reaffirm the court's belief that recompense should be available to
individuals suffering from emotional distress, although unaccompanied by physical injury, where those injuries are a proximate result

against the doctor. [d. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. It held that because the
doctor had a highly infectious disease, and because the danger of transmitting
that disease to others with whom he came into contact was foreseeable, the
doctor had a duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid transmission of the
disease. [d. This duty was breached when the doctor failed to inform the
plaintiff of his condition and failed to refrain from engaging in sexual contact
with her. [d. When the plaintiff became infected with genital herpes as a result
of her contact with the doctor, she thereby suffered injuries proximately caused
by the doctor's breach of his duty. [d.
The court then addressed the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. There are four elements that
must be established to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See supra note 112. The element which requires that the emotional
distress be severe does not require that it produce total emotional or physical
disablement. [d. at 148-49, 538 A.2d at 1181. The B.N. court held that the
plaintiff's case satisfied the first three elements of the tort, but remanded the
case to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's emotional distress was
severe. [d. at 148-49, 538 A.2d at 1182.
116. See supra note 3. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City for further proceedings to determine the truth of the appellants' allegations.
Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 459, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (1993).
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of the defendant's breach of a legal duty. Critics of the decision
may believe otherwise.
At a time when reported cases of AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases are on the rise, it may be argued that the Faya
decision will open a Pandora's box.l17 The willingness of Maryland
courts to allow recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting
solely from the fear of contracting a disease, especially where the
disease does not materialize, may significantly increase litigation and
the amount of damages recoverable where none may have been
recovered previously.118 On the other hand, where the consequences
of a defendant's wrongful act are severe, it seems equitable to allow
a plaintiff to recover damages resulting from any legitimate injuries
arising from defendant's conduct, whether those injuries are to the
mind or the body.
Where the transmission of AIDS is at issue, public policy may
dictate that recovery be made available for those suffering from the
fear of contracting the disease, even where the likelihood of infection
is minimal. The Faya decision appears to embrace this view. Rather
than focus on the probability of the appellants' infection under the
circumstances of the case, the court of appeals focused on the fatal
consequences of the harm that would have resulted had the appellants
been infected. By acknowledging the seriousness of the potential
harm, the court implied that an HIV-infected physician should refrain
from performing surgery altogether. This may be especially appropriate where, as with AIDS, all avenues of transmission of the
infectious disease are not yet known. Although there are no documented cases of AIDS transmission from surgeon to patient,1I9 it
may be prudent to err on the side of caution, particularly where the
potential consequences are so profound.

117. This fear may be justified. Less than nine months after the Faya decision,
more than 30 former patients of Dr. Almaraz commenced suit against his estate
alleging emotional distress injuries similar to those experienced by Faya and
Rossi. Jay Apperson, Ex-Patients of Doctor who Died of AIDS File Suit, The
Sun, Nov. 24, 1993, at 4B. Johns Hopkins Hospital corresponded with over
1,800 of the doctor's patients to disclose his illness. Id. It is conceivable,
therefore, that many more of Dr. Almaraz's patients will bring similar actions
against his estate.
U8. See supra note 117.
119. See supra note 75. This argument may no longer be persuasive. The first
reported case of possible HIV transmission from a health care worker to a
patient was reported by the Centers for Disease Control on July 27, 1990.
Jane H. Barney, Comment, A Health Care Worker's Duty to Undergo Routine
Testing for HIVIAIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients, 52 LA. L.
REV. 933, 934 (1992). The report indicated that a Florida dentist was believed
to have transmitted the HIV virus to Kimberly Bergalis and at least two of his
other patients. Id. at 934.
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The Faya decision appears to take such an approach by establishing a legal duty beyond that recommended by the AMA policy
statement that HIV -infected physicians refrain from activity posing
a significant risk of HIV transmission;l20 it implies that any risk of
transmission, however slight, is patently unacceptable. 121 Although
the court cited Sard v. Hardyl22 for the proposition that an HIVinfected physician may have a legal duty to inform a patient of his
infection, the implications of the court's decision are that a mere
warning is not enough.
The court's decision does not imply that a plaintiff has the carte
blanche right to recover damages for emotional distress resulting
from the fear of contracting AIDS or any other infectious disease.
The Faya court wisely limits such recovery only to those injuries
which are reasonable, that is, to those injuries that occur between
the time a plaintiff learns of the possibility of infection and the time
when the plaintiff's fear is put to rest. 123 Any fear which continues
after that period may be unreasonable, and therefore uncompensable. 124 By requiring that such injuries also be objectively demonstrated,125 the court seeks to ensure that the injuries are genuine and
not merely simulated. In light of these safeguards, the Faya decision
should not significantly increase the probability of fictitious claims
for emotional distress.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the Faya decision, the court of appeals has legitimatized
injuries to the mind, but has indicated its cognizance of the fact that
such injuries must remain subject to close scrutiny. The Faya decision
is a successful blend of reason and compassion. To deny recovery
to a plaintiff whose injuries are capable of objective determination
merely because that plaintiff was not physically injured in the traditional sense is to imply that the mind, which exercises ultimate
domain over the body, is somehow less worthy of protection. This
is a notion that Faya will hopefully dispel. The decision does not
impose any greater burden on plaintiffs suffering from genuine
injuries; instead, it serves to curtail frivolous claims while allowing
those individuals who have genuinely suffered at the negligent hands
of another an opportunity for recovery·.
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By also suggesting that a physician infected with the. HIV virus
may have a legal duty to inform his patient of such infection, the
court has demonstrated a willingness to place the sanctity of human
life over all other concerns. To refuse to require a physician to
disclose his HIV-positive status because of concerns regarding the
physician's privacy and ability to earn a living would be the equivalent
. of giving those who have the power to cure the power to kill as
well.
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